Let us consider the alternative proposed by Gentlemen instead of the power of laying direct taxes. After the States shall have refused to comply, weigh the consequences of the exercise of this power by IV. CONVENTION DEBATESCongress. When it comes in the form of a punishment, great clamourswill be raised among the people against the Government; hatred willbe excited against it. It will be considered as an ignominious stigmaon the State. It will be considered at least in this light by the Statewhere the failure is made, and these sentiments will no doubt be diffused through the other States. Now let us consider the effect, ifcollectors are sent where the State Governments refuse to comply withrequisitions. It is too much the disposition of mankind not to stop atone violation of duty. I conceive that every requisition that will bemade on any part of America, will kindle a contention between thedelinquent member, and the General Government. Is there no reasonto suppose divisions in the Government (for seldom does any thingpass with unanimity) on the subject of requisitions? The parts leastexposed will oppose those measures which may be adopted for thedefence of the weakest parts. Is there no reason to presume, that theRepresentatives from the delinquent State will be more likely to fosterdisobedience to the requisitions of the Government, than study torecommend them to the public? There is, in my opinion, another point of view in which this alternative will produce great evil. I will suppose, what is very probable, that partial compliances will be made. A difficulty here arises whichfully demonstrates its impolicy. If a part be paid, and the rest withheld, how is the General Government to proceed? They are to impose a tax, but how shall it be done in this case? Are they to impose it byway ofpunishment, on those who have paid, as well as those who have not? All these considerations taken in view (for they are not visionaryorfanciful speculations) will, perhaps, produce this consequence. TheGeneral Government to avoid those disappointments which I first described, and to avoid the contentions and embarrassments which I lastdescribed, will, in all probability, throw the public burdens on thosebranches of revenue which will be more in their power. They will becontinuallynecessitated to augment the imposts. If we throw a disproportion of the burdens on that side, shall we not discourage commerce, and suffer many political evils? Shall we not increase that disproportion on the Southern States, which for some time will operateagainst us? The Southern States, from having fewer manufactures, willimport and consume more. They will therefore pay more of the imposts. The more commerce is burdened, the more the disproportionwill operate against them. If direct taxation be mixed with other taxes, it will be in the power of the General Government to lessen thatinequality. But this inequality will be increased to the utmost extent, if the General Government have not this power. There is another pointJAMES MADISON, 11 JUNEof view in which this subject affords us instruction. The imports will decrease in time of war. The Honorable Gentleman who spoke yesterday [James Monroe], said, that the imposts would be so productive, that there would be no occasion of laying taxes. I will submit two observations to him and the Committee. First: In time of war thet imposts will be less; and as I hope we are considering Government for a perpetual duration, we ought to provide for every future contingency. At present our importations bear a full proportion to the full amount of our sales, and to the number of our inhabitants; but when we have inhabitants enough, our imports will decrease; and as. the national demands will increase with our population, our resourcesI will increase as our wants increase. The other consideration which I will submit on this part of the subject is this-I believe that it will be found in practice, that those who fix the public burdens, will feel a greater degree of responsibility when they are to impose them on the citizens immediately, than if they were only to say what sum should be paid by the States. If they exceed the limits of propriety, universal' discontentment and clamour will arise. Let us suppose they were to collect the taxes from the citizens of America-would they not consider their circumstances? Would they not attentively consider what could. be done by the citizens at large? Were they to exceed in their demands, what were reasonable burdens, the people would impute it to the right source, and look on the imposers as odious. When I consider the nature of the various objections brought against this clause, I should be led to think, that the difficulties were such that Gentlemen would not be able to get over them, and that the power, as defined in the plan of the Convention, was impracticable. I shall trouble them with a few observations on that point. It has been said, that ten men deputed from this State, and others in proportion from other States, will not be able to adjust direct taxest so as to accommodate the various citizens in thirteen States. I confess I do not see the force of this observation. Could not ten intelligent men, chosen from ten districts from this State, lay direct taxes on a few objects in the most judicious manner? It is to be conceived, that they would be acquainted with the situation of the different citizens of this country. Can anyone divide this State into any ten districts so as not to contain men of sufficient information? Could not one man of knowledge be found in a district? When thus selected, will theynot be able to carry their knowledge into the General Council? I may say with great propriety, that the experience of our own Legislature demonstrates the competency of Congress to lay taxes wisely.l Our Assembly consists of considerably more than a hundred, yet fromCONVENTION DEBATES the nature of the business, it devolves on a much smaller number. It is through their sanction, approved of by all the others. It will be found that there are seldom more than ten men who rise to high information on this subject. Our Federal Representatives, as has been said by the Gentleman, (Mr. Marshall who entered into the subject 1 with a great deal of ability, will get information from the State Governments. They will be perfectly well informed of the circumstances of the people of the different States, and the mode of taxation that would be most convenient for them, from the laws of the States. In laying taxes, they may even refer to the State systems of taxation. Let it not be forgotten, that there is a probability, that that ignorance which is complained of in some parts of America, will be continually diminishing. Let us compare the degree of knowledge which the people had in time past, to their present information. Does not our own experience teach us, that the people are better informed than they were a few years ago? The citizen of Georgia knows more now of the affairs of New-Hampshire, than he did before the revolution, of those of South-Carolina. When the Representatives from the different States are collected together, to consider this subject, they will interchange their knowledge with one another, and will have the laws of each State on the table. Besides this, the intercourse of the States will be continually increasing. It is now much greater than before the revolution. My honorable friend over the way, (Mr. Monro) yesterday, seemed to conceive, as an insuperable objection, that if land were made the particular object of taxation, it would be unjust, as it would exonerate the commercial part of the community-That if it were laid on trade, it would be unjust in discharging the landholders; and that anyexclusive selection would be unequal and unfair. If the General Government were tied down to one object, I confess the objection would have some force in it. But if this be not the case, it can have no weight. If it should have a general power of taxation, they could select the most proper objects, and distribute the taxes in such a manner, as that they should fall in a due degree on every member of the community. They will be limited to fix the proportion of each State, and they must raise it in the most convenient and satisfactory manner to the public. The honorable member [James Monroe] considered itas another insuperable objection, that uniform laws could not be made for thirteen States, and that dissonance would produce inconvenience and oppression. Perhaps it may not be found, on due enquiry, to be so impracticable as he supposes. But were it so, where is the evil of different laws operating in different States, to raise money for the General Government? Where is the evil of such laws? There are JAMES MADISON, 11 JUNE instances in other countries, of different laws operating in different parts of the country, without producing any kind of oppression. The revenue-laws are different in England and Scotland in several respects. Their laws relating to custom, excises, and trade, are similar; but those respecting direct taxation are dissimilar. There is a land-tax in England, and a land-tax in Scotland, but the laws concerning them are not the same. It is much heavier in proportion, in the former than in the latter. The mode of collection is different-yet this is not productive of any national inconvenience. Were we to conclude from the objections against the proposed plan, this dissimilarity, in that point alone, would have involved those kingdoms in difficulties. In England itself there is a variety of different laws operating differently in different places. I will make another observation on the objection of my honorable friend. He seemed to conclude, that concurrent collections under different authorities, were not reducible to practice. I agree that were they independent of the people, the argument would be good. But theymust serve one common master. They must act in concert, or the defaulting party must bring on itself the resentment of the people. If the General Government be so constructed, that it will not dare to impose such burdens, as will distress the people, where is the evilof its having a power of taxation concurrent with the States? The people would not support it were it to impose oppressive burdens. Let me make one more comparison of the State Governments to this plan. Do not the States impose taxes for local purposes? Does the concurrent collection of taxes, imposed by the Legislatures for general purposes, and of levies laid by the counties for parochial and county purposes, produce any inconvenience or oppression? The collection of these taxes is perfectly practicable, and consistent with the views of both parties. The people at large are the common superior of the State Governments, and the General Government. It is reasonable to conclude, that they will avoid interferences for two causes-To avoid public oppression, and to render the collections more productive. I conceive they will be more likely to produce disputes, in rendering it convenient for the people, than run into interfering regulations. In the third place I shall consider, whether the power of taxation to be given the General Government be safe: And first, whether it be safe as to the public liberty in general. It would be sufficient to remark, that they are, because, I conceive, the point has been clearlyestablished by more than one Gentleman who has spoken on the same side of the question. In the decision of this question, it is of importance to examine whether elections of Representatives by great districts of IV. CONVENTION DEBATES freeholders be favourable to fidelity in Representatives. The greatest degree of treachery in Representatives, is to be apprehended where they are chosen by the least number of electors; because there is a greater facility of using undue influence, and because the electors must be less independent. This position is verified in the most unanswerable manner, in that country to which appeals are so often made, and sometimes instructively. Who are the most corrupt members in Parliament? Are theynot the inhabitants of small towns and districts? The supporters of liberty are from the great counties. Have we not seen that the Representatives of the city of London, who are chosen by such thousands of voters, have continually studied and supported the liberties of the people, and opposed the corruption of the Crown? We have seen continually that most of the members in the ministerial majority are drawn from small circumscribed districts. We may therefore conclude, that our Representatives being chosen by such extensive districts, will be upright and independent In proportion as we have securityagainst corruption in Representatives, we have security against corruption from every other quarter whatsoever. I shall take a view ofcertain subjects which will lead to some reflections, to quiet the minds of those Gentlemen who think that the individual Governments will be swallowed up by the General Government. In order to effect this, it is proper to compare the State Governments to the General Government with respect to reciprocal dependence, and with respect to the means they have of supporting themselves, or encroaching on one another. At the first comparison we must be struck with these remarkable facts. The General Government has not the appointment ofa single branch of the individual Governments, or of anyofficers within the States, to execute their laws. Are not the States integral parts of the General Government? Is not the President chosen under the influence of the State Legislatures? May we not suppose that he will be complaisant to those from whom he has his appointment, and ' from whom he must have his re-appointment? The Senators are appointed altogether by the Legislatures. My honorable friend [James Monroe] apprehended a coalition be- tween the President, Senate, and House of Representatives against the States. This could be supposed only from a similarity of the component parts. A coalition is not likely to take place, because its component parts are heterogeneous in their nature. The House of Representatives is not chosen by the State Governments, but under the influence of those who compose the State Legislature. Let us suppose ten men appointed to carry the Government into effect, there is every degree of certainty, JAMES MADISON, 11 JUNE that they would be indebted for their re-election, to the members of the Legislatures. If they derive their appointment from them, will they not execute their duty to them? Besides this, will not the people (whoset predominant interest will ultimately prevail) feel great attachment to, f the State Legislatures? They have the care of all local interests-Those familiar domestic objects, for which men have the strongest predilection. The General Government on the contrary, has the preservation of the aggregate interests of the Union-objects, which being less familiar , and more remote from men's notice, have a less powerful influence on their minds. Do we not see great and natural attachments arising from local considerations? This will be the case in a much stronger degree in the State Governments, than in the General Government. The people will be attached to their State Legislatures from; a thousand causes; and into whatever scale the people at large will throw themselves, that scale will preponderate. Did we not perceive in the early stages of the war, when Congress was the idol of America, and when in pursuit of the object most dear to America, that they were attached to their States? Afterwards the whole current of their affection was to the States, and would be still the case were it not forw the alarming situation of America. At one period of the Congressional history, they had power to trample on the States. When they had that fund of paper money in their hands, and could carry on all their measures without any dependence on the States, was there any disposition to debase the State Governments? All that municipal authority which was necessary to carryon the administration of the Government, they still retained unimpaired. There was no attempt to diminish it. I am led by what fell from my honorable friend yesterday to take this supposed combination in another view. Is it supposed, that the influence of the General Government will facilitate a combination between the members? Is it supposed, that it will preponderate against that of the State Governments? The means of influence consists in having the disposal of gifts and emoluments, and in the number off persons employed by, and dependent upon a Government. Will any Gentleman compare the number of persons, which will be employed in the General Government, with the number of those which will be in the State Governments? The number of dependents upon the Stateto Governments will be infinitely greater than those on the General Government. I may say with truth, that there never was a more oeconomical Government in any age or country; nor which will require fewer hands, or give less influence. Let us compare the members.composing the Legislative, Executive, IV. CONVENTION DEBATES and Judicial powers in the General Government, with those in the States, and let us take into view the vast number of persons employed in the States; from the chief officers to the lowest, we will find the scale preponderating so much in favor of the States, that while so many persons are attached to them, it will be impossible to turn the balance against them. There will be an irresistible bias towards the State Governments. Consider the number of militia officers, the number of Justices of the Peace, the number of the members of the Legislatures, and all the various officers for districts, towns, and corporations, all intermixing with, and residing among the people at large. While this part of the community retains their affection to the State Governments, I conceive that the fact will be, that the State Governments, and not the General Government, will preponderate. It cannot be contradicted that they have more extensive means of influence. I have my fears as well as the Honorable Gentleman-But my fears are on the other side. Experience, I think, will prove (though there be no infallible proof of it here) that the powerful and prevailing influence of the States, will produce such attention to local considerations as will be inconsistent with the advancement of the interests of the Union. But I choose rather to indulge my hopes than fears, because I flatter myself if inconveniences should result from it, that the clause which provides amendments will remedy them. The combination of powers vested in those persons, would seem conclusive in favor of the States. The powers of the General Government relate to external objects, and are but few. But the powers in the States relate to those great objects which immediately concern the prosperity of the people. Let us observe also, that the powers in the General Government are those which will be exercised mostly in time of war, while those of the State Governments will be exercised in time of peace. But I hope the time of war will be little compared to that of peace. I should not complete the view which ought to be taken of this subject, without making this additional remark, that the powers vested in the proposed Government, are not so much an augmentation of powers in the General Government, as a change rendered necessary, for the purpose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it before. It cannot escape any Gentleman, that this power in theory, exists in the Confederation, as fullyas in this Constitution. The only difference is this, that now they tax States, and by this plan they will tax individuals. There is no theoretic difference between the two. But in practice there will be an infinite difference between them. The one is an ineffectual power: The other is adequate to the purpose for which it is given. This change was necessary for the public safety. JAMES MADISON, 11 JUNE Let us suppose for a moment, that the acts of Congress requiring money from the States, had been as effectual as the paper on the table-Suppose all the laws of Congress had had complete compliance, will any Gentleman say, as far as we can judge from past experience, that the State Governments would have been debased, and all consolidated and incorporated in one system? My imagination cannot reach it. I conceive, that had those acts that effect which all laws ought to have, the States would have retained their sovereignty. It seems to be supposed, that it will introduce new expences and burdens on the people. I believe it is not necessary here to make a comparison between the expences of the present and of the proposed Government.
All agree that the General Government ought to have power for the regulation of commerce. I will venture to say, that very great improvements and very ceconomical regulations will be made. It will be a principal object to guard against smuggling, and such other attacks on the revenue as other nations are subject to. We are now obliged to defend against those lawless attempts, but from the interfering regulations of different States, with little success. There arei regulations in different States which are unfavourable to the inhabitants of other States, and which militate against the revenue. New-Yorkct, levies money from New-Jersey by her imposts. In New-Jersey, instead of cooperatingwith New-York, the Legislature favors violations on her regulations. This will not be the case when uniform regulations will be made.1
Requisitions though ineffectual are unfriendly to ceconomy.-When requisitions are submitted to the States, there are near 2500 or 2000 persons deliberating on the mode of payment. All these, during their deliberation, receive public pay. A great proportion of every session,,-' in every State, is employed to consider whether they will pay at all, and in what mode. Let us suppose 1500 persons are deliberatingon this subject. Let anyone make a calculation-It will be found that a very few days of their deliberation will consume more of the public money, than one year of that of the General Legislature. This is not, all, Mr. Chairman. When general powers will be vested in the General Government, there will be less of that mutability which is seen in thet Legislation of the States. The consequence will be a great savingoft expence and time. There is another great advantage which I will but barelymention. The greatest calamity to which the United States can be subject, is a vicissitude of laws, and continual shifting and changing from one object to another, which must expose the people to various inconveniences. This has a certain effect, of which sagacious men always have, and always will make an advantage. From whom is this advantageIV. CONVENTION DEBATES made? From the industrious farmers and tradesmen, who are ignorant of the means of making such advantages. The people will not be exposed to these inconveniences under an uniform and steady course of Legislation. But they have been so heretofore. The history of taxation of this country is so fully and well known to every member of this Committee, that I shall say no more of it. We have hitherto discussed the subject very irregularly. I dare not dictate to any Gentleman, but I hope we shall pursue that mode of going through the business, which the House resolved. With respect to a great variety of arguments made use of I mean to take notice of them when we come to those parts of the Constitution to which they apply. If we exchange this mode, for the regular way of proceeding, we can finish it better in one week than in one month. A desultory conversation arose concerning the mode of discussion. Mr. Henry declared it as his opinion, that the best mode was to , discuss it at large. That the Gentlemen on the other side had done so, as well as those of his side; and he hoped that every Gentleman would consider himself at liberty to go into the subject fully, because he thought it the best way to elucidate it. Mr. Madison wished not to exclude any light that could be cast on the subject. He declared that he would be the last man that would object to the fullest investigation; but at the same time, he thought it would be more elucidated by a regular progressive discussion, than by that unconnected irregular method which they had hitherto pursued. Mr. George Mason-Mr. Chairman-Gentlemen will be pleased to consider, that on so important a subject as this, it is impossible in the nature of things, to avoid arguing more at large than is usual. You will allow that I have not taken up a great part of your time. But as Gentlemen have indulged themselves in entering at large into the subject, I hope to be permitted to follow them, and answer their observations. The worthy member (Mr. Nicholas) at a very early day, gave us an accurate detail of the representation of the people in Britain, and of the rights of the King of Britain; and illustrated his observations by a quotation from Doctor Price. Gentlemen will please to take notice, that those arguments relate to a single Government, and that theyare . not applicable to this case. However applicable they may be to such a Government as that of Great-Britain, it will be entirely inapplicable to such a Government as ours. The Gentleman in drawing comparison between the representation of the people in the House of Commons in England, and the representation in the Government now proposed to us, has been pleased to express his approbation in favor ofGEORGE MASON, 11 JUNE the American Government. Let us examine. I think that there are about 550 members in the English House of Commons. The people of Britain have a representation in Parliament of 550 members, who intimately mingle with all classes of the people, feeling and knowing their circumstances. In the proposed American Government-in a country perhaps ten times more extensive, we are to have a representation of 65, who from the nature of the Government, cannot possibly be mingled with the different classes of the people, nor have a fellow feeling for them. They must form an Aristocracy, and will not regard the interest of the people. Experience tells us, that men pay most I regard to those whose rank and situation are similar to their own. In the course of the investigation, the Gentleman mentioned the bribery and corruption of Parliament, and drew a conclusion, the very reverse of what I should have formed on the subject He said, if I recollect rightly, that the American representation is more secured against bribery and corruption, than the English Parliament Are 65 better than 550? Bribery and corruption, in my opinion, will be practised in America more than in England, in proportion as 550 exceed 65; and there will be less integrity and probity in proportion as 65 is less than 550. From what source is the bribery practised in the British Parliament derived? I think the principal source is the distribution of places, offices, and posts. Will any Gentleman deny this? Give me leave on this occasion to recur to that clause of the Constitution, which speaks of restraint, and has the appearance of restraining from corruption, but which, when examined, will be found to be no restraint at all. The clause runs thus: "No Senator, or Representative, shall during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under theV: authorityof the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and, no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a mem-. ber of either House during his continuance in office." This appears to me to be no restraint at all. It is to be observed, that this restraint onlyextends to civil offices. But I will not examine whether it be a proper distinction or not. What is the restraint as to civil offices? Only that they shall not be appointed to offices which shall have been created, or the emoluments where of shall have been increased during the time for which they shall have been elected. They may be appointed to existing offices, if the emoluments be not increased during the time for which they were elected. (Here Mr. Mason spoke too low to be heard.) Thus after the Government is set in motion, the restraint will be gone. They may appoint what number of officers they please. They may send Ambassadors to every part of Europe. Here is, Sir, I think, IV. CONVENTION DEBATESas wide a door for corruption as in any Government in Europe-Thereis the same inducement for corruption-There is the same room for it in this Government, which they have in the British Government, and in proportion as the number is smaller, corruption will be greater.
That unconditional power of taxation which is given to that Government cannot but oppress the people. If instead of this, a conditional power of taxation be given, in case of refusal to comply with requisitions, the same end will be answered with convenience to the people. This will not lessen the power of Congress. We do not want to lessen the power of Congress unnecessarily. This will produce moderation in the demand, and will prevent the ruinous exercise of that power by those who know not our situation. We shall then have that mode of taxation which is the most easy, and least oppressive to the people, because it will be exercised by those who are acquainted with their condition and circumstances. This, Sir, is the great object we wish to secure, that our people should be taxed by those who have a fellow feeling for them. I think I can venture to assert, that the General - )! Government will lay such taxes as are the easiest and most productive in the collection. This is natural and probable. For exampleThey may lay a poll tax. This is simple and easily collected, but is of all taxes the most grievous-Why the most grievous? Because it falls light on the rich, and heavy on the poor. It is most oppressive, for if the rich man is taxed, he can only retrench his superfluities; but the conse- quence to the poor man is, that it increases his miseries. That they will lay the most simple taxes, and such as are easiest to collect, is highly probable, nay, almost absolutely certain. I shall take the liberty on this occasion, to read you a letter which will shew, at least as far as opinion goes, what sort of taxes will be most probably laid on us, if we adopt this Constitution. It was the opinion of a Gentleman of information. It will in some degree establish the fallacy of those reports which have been circulated through the country, and which induced a great many poor ignorant people to believe that the taxes were to be lessened by the adoption of the proposed Government.-(Here Mr. Mason read a letter from Mr. Robert Morris, financier of the United States, to Congress, wherein he spoke of the propriety of laying the following taxes for the use of the United States; viz: six shillings on every hundred acres of land, six shillings per poll, and nine pence per gallon on all spirituous liquours distilled in the country. Mr. Mason declared, that he did not mean to make the smallest reflection on Mr. Morris, but introduced his letter to shew what taxes would probably be laid)-He then continued-This will at least shew that such taxes were in agitation, and were strongly advocated by a considerable partGEORGE MASON, 11 JUNE of Congress. I have read this letter to shew that they will lay the taxes most easy to be collected, without any regard to our convenience; so that instead of amusing ourselves with a diminution of our taxes, we mayrest assured that they will be increased. But my principal reason for introducing it was, to shew that taxes would be laid by those who are not acquainted with our situation, and that the agents of the collection may be consulted upon the most productive and most simple mode of taxation. The Gentleman who wrote this letter had morel, information on this subject than we have, but this will shew Gentlemen that we are not to be eased of taxes. Any of these taxes which have been pointed out by this financier as the most eligible, will be ruinous and unequal, and will be particularly oppressive on the poorest part of the people. As to a poll tax, I have already spoken of its iniquitous operation, and need not say much of it, because it is so generally disliked in this State, that we were obliged to abolish it last year. As to a land tax-it will operate most unequally. The man who has 100 acres of the richest land will pay as little as a man who has 100 acres of the poorest land. Near Philadelphia or Boston an acre of land is worthone hundred pounds, yet the possessor of it will pay no more than the man with us whose land is hardly worth 20 shillings an acre. Some land-holders in this State will have to pay 20 times as much as will be paid for all the land on which Philadelphia stands. And as to excises-This will carry the exciseman to every farmer's house who distills a little brandy, where he may search and ransack as he pleases. These I mention as specimens of the kind of tax which is to be laid upon us by those who have no information of our situation, and by a Government where the wealthy are only represented.2
It is urged that no new power is given up to the General Government, and thatr the Confederation had those powers before. That system derived its, power from the State Governments. When the people of Virginiaf formed their Government, they reserved certain great powers in the Billof Rights. They would not trust their own citizens, who had a similarityof interest with themselves, and who had frequent and intimate communication with them. They would not trust their own fellow-citizens, I say, with the exercise of those great powers reserved in the Bill of Rights. Do we not by this system give up a great part of the rights, reserved by the Bill of Rights, to those who have no fellow feeling for the people-To a Government where the Representatives will have no communication with the people?
I say then that there are great and important powers which were not transferred to the State Government, given up to the General Government by this Constitution. Let us advert to the 6th article. It expressly declares that, "This Constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance there of and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Now, Sir, if the laws and Constitution of the General Government, as expressly said, be paramount to those of any State, are not those rights with which we were afraid to trust our own citizens " annulled and given up to the General Government? The Bill of Rights is a part of our own Constitution. The Judges are obliged to take notice of the laws of the General Government, consequently the rights secured by our Bill of Rights are given up. If they are not given up, where are they secured? By implication? Let Gentlemen shew that they are secured in a plain, direct, unequivocal manner. It is not in their power. Then where is the security? Where is the barrier drawn between the Government and the rights of the citizens, as secured in our own State Government? These rights are given up in that paper, but I trust this Convention will never give them up, but will take pains to secure them to the latest posterity. If a check be necessary in our own State Government, it is much more so in a Government where our Representatives are to be at the distance of 1000 miles from us without any responsibility.3