The Convention met according to adjournment.
Mr. Nicholas urged that the Convention should either proceed according to the original determination, clause by clause, or rescind that order and go into the Constitution at large.
Mr. Henry opposed the motion as to taking up the subject clause by clause. He thought it ought to be considered at large. He observed, that among a great variety of subjects, the business of the Mississippi had taken up a great deal of time. He wished before they should take leave of that subject, that the transactions of Congress relative to the navigation of that river should be communicated to the Convention, in order that they might draw their conclusion from the best source. For this purpose he hoped that those Gentlemen who had been then in Congress, and the present members of Congress who were in Convention, would communicate what they knew on the subject He declared, that he did not wish to hurt the feelings of the Gentlemen who had been in Congress, or to reflect on any private character: But that for the information of the Convention, he was desirous of having the most authentic account, and a faithful statement of facts.
Mr. Nicholas had no objection to Mr. Henry's proposal.
Mr. Madison then declared that if the Honorable Gentleman thought that he had given an incorrect account of the transactions relative to the Mississippi, he would, on a thorough and complete investigation, find himself mistaken. That he had his information from his own knowledge, and from a perusal of the documents and papers which related to those transactions. That it had always been his opinion, that the policy which had for its object the relinquishment of that river, was unwise, and that the mode of conducting it, was still more exception-able-He added, that he had no objection to have every light on the subject that could tend to elucidate it.
Mr. Nicholas hoped, that after the information should be given respecting that river, they would confine themselves to the order of the House.
The Convention then resolved itself into a Committee of the whole Convention, to take into further consideration the proposed Constitution, and more particularly for the purpose of receiving information concerning the transactions of Congress relative to the Mississippi- Mr. Wythe in the chair. On motion-The acts and resolutions of Assembly relative to the Mississippi were read.-
Mr. Lee of Westmoreland, then in a short speech related several Congressional transactions respecting that river, and strongly asserted, that it was the inflexible and determined resolution of Congress never to give it up.-That the Secretary of Foreign Affairs [John Jay], who was authorised to form a treaty with Gardoqui, the Spanish Ambassador, had positive directions not to assent to give up that navigation, and that it never had been their intention or wish to relinquish it.- That on the contrary, they earnestly wished to adopt the best possible plan of securing it.
After some desultory conversation, Mr. Monroe spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman-My conduct respecting the transactions of Congress, upon this interesting subject, since my return to the State, has been well known to many worthy Gentlemen here.-I have been often called upon before this, in a public line, and particularly in the last Assembly, whilst I was present, for information of these transactions; but have heretofore declined it, and for reasons that were held satisfactory. Being amenable upon the principles of the Federal compact, to the Legislature for my conduct in Congress, it cannot be doubted, if re-quired, it were my duty to obey their directions; but that honorable body thought it best to dispense with such demand.-The right in this Assembly is unquestionably more complete, having powers paramount to that;-but even here I could wish it had not been exerted as I understand it to be, by going into Committee for that purpose.-Before, however, I enter into this subject, I cannot but observe, it has given me pain to hear it treated by Honorable Gentlemen in a manner that has appeared not altogether free from exception. For they have not gone into it fully, and given a proper view of the transaction in every part, but of those only which preceded and were subsequent to that, which has been the particular object of enquiry; a conduct that has seemed too much calculated to make an impression favorable to their wishes in the present instance. But in making this observation, I owe it to those Gentlemen to declare, that it is my opinion such omission has proceeded not from intention, but their having forgotten facts, or to some cause not obvious to me, and which I make no doubt they will readily explain.
The policy of this State respecting this river has always been the same. It has contemplated but one object, the opening it for the use of the inhabitants, whose interest depended on it-and in this, she has, in my opinion, shewn her wisdom and magnanimity. I may, I believe, with propriety say, that all the measures that have at any time been taken by Congress for that purpose, were adopted at the instance of this State.-There was a time, it is true, Sir, when even this State, in some measure abandoned the object, by authorising its cession to the Court of Spain. But let us take all circumstances into view, as they were at that time, and I am persuaded it will by no means shew a departure from this liberal and enlightened system of policy, although it may manifest an accommodation to the exigencies which pressed onus at the time.-The Southern States were overrun and in possession of the enemy.-The Governments of South-Carolina and Georgia were prostrate, and opposition there at an end-North-Carolina made but a feeble resistance; and Virginia herself was greatly harrassed by the enemy in force at that time in the heart of the country, and by impressments for her own and the defence of the Southern States.-In of the United States, with these ultimata, "That he enter into no treaty, compact or convention whatever, with the said representative of Spain, which did not stipulate our right to the navigation of the Mississippi, and the boundaries as established in our treaty with Great-Britain."- And thus the late negotiation commenced, and under auspicies, as I supposed, very favorable to the wishes of the United States; for Spain had become sensible of the propriety of cultivating the friendship of these States.-Knowing our claim to the navigation of this river, she had sent a Minister hither principally to treat on that point-and the time would not be remote when, under the increasing population of that country, the inhabitants would be able to open it, without our assistance or her consent.-These circumstances being considered, was it not presumable she intended to make a merit of her concession to our wishes, and to agree to an accommodation upon that subject, that would not only be satisfactory, but highly pleasing to the United States-But what was the issue of this negotiation?-How was it terminated?-Has it forwarded the particular object in view, or otherwise promoted the interests and the harmony of the States, or any of them?-Eight or ten months elapsed without any communications of its progress to Congress: At length a letter was received from the Secretary, stating that difficulties had arisen in his negotiation with the representative of Spain, which, in his opinion, should be so managed, as that even their existence should remain a secret for the present, and proposing that a Committee be appointed with full power to direct and instruct him in every case relative to the proposed treaty. As the only ultimata in his instructions respected the Mississippi and the boundaries, it readily occurred that these occasioned the difficulties alluded to, and were those he wished to remove. And for many reasons this appeared at least to me an extraordinary proposition. By the Articles of Confederation nine States are necessary to enter into treaties.-The instruction is the foundation of the treaty; for if it is formed agreeable thereto, good faith requires that it be ratified.-The practice of Congress hath also been always, I believe, in conformity to this idea.-The instructions under which our commercial treaties have been made were carried by nine States-Those under which the Secretary now acted were passed by nine States.-The proposition then would be, that the powers which under the Constitution nine States only were competent to, should be transferred to a Committee, and the object thereby to disengage himself from the ultimata already mentioned in his existing instructions.-In this light the subject was taken up, and on these principles discussed.-The Secretary, Mr. Jay, being at length called before Congress to explain the difficulties mentioned in his letter, presented to their view the project of a treaty of commerce, containing, as he supposed, advantageous stipulations in our favor, in that line; in consideration for which we were to contract to forbear the use of the navigation of the river Mississippi for the term of twenty-five or thirty years, and earnestly advised our adopting it. The subject now took a decided form-there was no further ambiguity in it-and we were surprised for reasons that have been already given, that he had taken up the subject of commerce at all.-We were greatly surprised it should form the principal object of the project, and that a partial or temporary sacrifice of that interest, for the advancement of which the negotiation was set on foot, should be the consideration proposed to be given for it. But the Honorable Secretary urged, that it was necessary to stand well with Spain-that the commercial project was a beneficial one, and should not be neglected-that a stipulation to forbear the use contained an acknowledgement, on her part, of the right in the United States; that we were in no condition to take the river, and therefore gave nothing for it; with other reasons which perhaps I have forgotten; for the subject in detail has nearly escaped my memory. We differed with the Honorable Secretary, almost in every respect. We admitted indeed the propriety of standing well with Spain, but supposed we might accomplish that end at least on equal terms. We considered the stipulation to forbear the use, as a species of barter, that should never be countenanced in the councils of the American States, since it might tend to the destruction of the society itself for a forbearance of the use of one river, might lead unto more extensive consequences-to that of the Chesapeake, the Potowmack, or any other of the rivers that emptied into it.-In short, that the councils of the confederacy should be conducted with more magnanimity and candour, should contemplate the benefit of all parts upon common principles, and not the sacrifice of one part for that of another. There appeared to us a material difference between stipulating by treaty to forbear the use, and not being able to open the river: The former would be considered by the inhabitants of the Western Country as an act of hostility; the latter might be justified by our inability.-And with respect to the commercial part of the project, we really thought it an ill advised one, on its own merits solely. Thus was this project brought before Congress, and so far as I recollect, in this form, and upon these principles.-It was the subject of tedious and lengthy discussion in that honorable body.-Every distinct measure that was taken I do not now remember, nor do I suppose it of consequence. I have shewn the outlines of the transaction, which is, if I apprehend rightly, all that the Committee wish to possess. The more indissoluble bond, or give the national Government more powers than myself I only wish to prevent it from doing harm, either to States or individuals; and the rights and interests of both, in a variety of instances, in which they are now left unprotected, might, in my opinion, be better guarded. If I have mistaken any facts, Honorable Gentlemen will correct me. If I omitted any, as it has not been intentional, so I shall be happy with their assistance to supply the defect. Mr. Monroe added several other observations, the purport of which was, that the interest of the Western Country would not be as secure under the proposed Constitution, as under the Confederation; because under the latter system, the Mississippi could not be relinquished with-out the consent of nine States, whereas by the former, he said, a majority, or seven States, could yield it. His own opinion was, that it would be given up by a majority of the Senators present in the Senate, with the President, which would put it in the power of less than seven States to surrender it. That the Northern States were inclined to yield it. That it was their interest to prevent an augmentation of the South-ern influence and power; and that as mankind in general, and States in particular, were governed by interest, the Northern States would not fail of availing themselves of the opportunity given them by the Constitution, relinquishing that river, in order to depress the Western Country, and prevent the Southern interest from preponderating.
Mr. Grayson-Mr. Chairman.-The Honorable Gentleman [Edmund Pendleton] was mistaken when he supposed that I said seven States had absolutely voted to surrender the navigation of the Mississippi. I only spoke of the general disposition of the States, which I alledged to be actuated by interest.-That consequently the carrying States were necessarily inclined against the extension of the interest and influence of the productive States, and that therefore they would not favor any measure to extend the settlements to the Westward.
I wished not to enter into this discussion, for the reasons mentioned by my honorable friend [James Monroe]. Secrecy was required on this subject. I told Congress, that imposing secrecy, on such a great oc-casion, was unwarrantable. However, as it was not given up, I conceived myself under some restraint. But since it has come before the Committee, and they desire to develop the subject, I shall stand excused for mentioning what I know of it. My honorable friend gave a very just account of it when he said that the Southern States were on their guard, and opposed every measure tending to relinquish or wa[i]ve that valuable right. They would not agree to negotiate, but on condition, that no proposition whatever should be made to surrender that great right.-There was a dispute between this country and Spain who claimed one half of Georgia, and one half of Kentucky, or if not that proportion, a very considerable part, as well as the absolute and exclusive navigation of the Mississippi.-The Southern States thought that the navigation of the Mississippi should not be trusted to any hands, but those in which the Confederation had placed the right of making treaties. That system required the consent of nine States for that purpose. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs was empowered to adjust the interfering claims of Spain and the United States, with the Spanish Minister, but as my honorable friend said, with an express prohibition of entering into any negotiation that would lead to the surrender of that river.-Affairs continued in this state for some time. At length a proposition was made to Congress, not directly, but by a side wind. The first proposal was to take off the fetters of the Secretary. When the whole came out, it was found to be a proposal to cede the Mississippi to Spain for 25 or 30 years, (for it was in the disjunctive) in consideration of certain commercial stipulations. In support of this proposal, it was urged, that the right was in him who surrendered, and that their acceptance of a temporary relinquishment, was an acknowledgment of our right, which would revert to us at the expiration of that period;-that we could not take it by war;-that the thing was useless to us, and that it would be wise and politic to give it up, as we were to receive a beneficial compensation for that temporary cession. Congress, after a great deal of animosity, came to a resolution, which, in my opinion, violated the Confederation. It was resolved by seven States, that the prohibition in the Secretary's instructions should be repealed; whereby the unrepealed part of his instructions authorised him to make a treaty, yielding that inestimable navigation, although by the Confederation, nine States were necessary to concur in the formation of a treaty! How then could seven States constitutionally adopt any measure, to which, by the Constitution, nine States were only competent?-It was entered on the journals, and transmitted to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for his direction in his negotiation with the Spanish Minister.
If I recollect rightly, by the law of nations, if a negotiator makes a treaty, in consequence of a power received from a sovereign authority, non-compliance with his stipulations is a just cause of war. The opposition suggested (whether wrong or not let this House determine) that this was the case:-That the proceeding was repugnant to the principles and express letter of the Constitution, and that if the com-pact which the Secretary might form with the Spanish Minister should not be complied with, it would be giving Spain a just cause of quarrel. So that we should be reduced to the dilemma of either violating the Constitution by a compliance, or involving us in war by a non-compliance. The opposition remonstrated against these transactions (and their remonstrance was entered on the journal) and took every step for securing this great national right. In the course of the debates in Congress on this subject, which were warm and animated, it was urged that Congress, by the law of nations, had no right, even with the consent of nine States, to dismember the empire, or relinquish any part of the territory appertaining to the aggregate society, to any foreign power. Territorial dismemberment, or the relinquishment of any other privilege, is the highest act of a sovereign power. The right of the territory has ever been considered as most sacred, and ought to be guarded in the most particular and cautious manner. Whether that navigation be secure on this principle, by the new Constitution, I will not pretend to determine. I will, however, say one thing. It is not well guarded under the old system. A majority of seven States are disposed to yield it. I speak not of any particular characters. I have the charity to suppose that all mankind act on the best motives. Suffice it for me to tell direct and plain facts, and leave the conclusion with this Honorable House.
It has been urged by my honorable friend on the other side (Mr. Madison) that the Eastern States were averse to surrender it during the war, and that the Southern States proposed it themselves, and wished to yield it. My honorable friend last up has well accounted for this disgraceful offer, and I will account for the refusal of the Eastern States to surrender it. Mr. Chairman, it is no new thing to you to discover these reasons. It is well known, that the Newfoundland fisheries and the Mississippi are balances for one another;-that the possession of one tends to the preservation of the other. This accounts for the Eastern policy.-They thought that if the Mississippi was given up, the Southern States would give up the rights of the fishery, on which their very existence depends. It is not extraordinary therefore, while these great rights of the fishery depend on such a variety of circumstances, the issue of war, the success of negotiations, and numerous other causes, that they should wish to preserve this great counterbalance.-What has been their conduct since the peace? When relieved from the apprehensions of losing that great advantage, they became solicitous of securing a superiority of influence in the national councils. They look at the true interest of nations. Their language has been-"Let us prevent any new States from rising in the Western world or they will out-vote us-We will lose our importance, and become as nothing in the scale of nations. If we do not prevent it, our countrymen will remove to those places, instead of going to sea, and we will receive no particular tribute or advantage from them."-This, Sir, has been the language and spirit of their policy, and I suppose ever will.
The Mississippi is not secured under the old Confederation; but it is better secured by that system, than by the new Constitution. By the existing system, nine States are necessary to yield it. A few States can give it away by the paper on your table. But I hope it will never be put in the power of a less number than nine States.
1 Jersey, we are told, changed her temper on that great occasion. I believe that that mutability depended on characters. But we have lost another State-Maryland-For, from fortuitous circumstances, those States deviated from their natural character-Jersey in not giving up the right of the Mississippi, and Maryland in giving it up.-Whatever be their object, each departed from her natural disposition. It is with great reluctance I have said any thing on this subject, and if I have misrepresented facts, I wish to be corrected.
Mr. Henry then arose, and requested that the Honorable Gentleman (Mr. Monroe) would discover the rest of the project, and what Spain was to do on her part, as an equivalent for the cession of the Mississippi.
Mr. Monroe-Mr. Chairman-I do not thoroughly recollect every circumstance relative to this project. But there was to be a commercial intercourse between the United States and Spain. We were to be allowed to carry our produce to the ports of Spain, and the Spaniards to have an equal right of trading hither. It was stipulated, that there should be a reciprocity of commercial intercourses and benefits be-tween the subjects of Spain, and the citizens of the United States. The manufactures of Spain were to be freely imported and vended in this country, and our manufactures to be carried to Spain, &c without obstruction, and both parties were to have mutual privileges in point of commercial intercourse and connection. This, Sir, is the amount of the project of Spain, which was looked upon as advantageous to us. I thought myself that it was not I considered Spain as being without manufactures-as the most slow in the progress of arts, and the most unwise with respect to commerce, of all nations under the sun, (in which respect I thought Great-Britain the wisest). Their Gentlemen and Nobles look on commerce with contempt. No man of character among them will undertake it They make little discrimination with any nation. Their character is to shut out all nations, and exclude every intercourse with them, and this would be the case with respect to us. Nothing is given to us by this project, but what is given to all other nations. It is bad policy and unjustifiable on such terms to yield that valuable right. Their merchants have great stocks in trade. It is not so with our merchants. Our people require encouragement. Mariners must be encouraged. On a review of these circumstances, I thought the project unwise and impolitic.
Mr. Madison-Mr. Chairman-It is extremely disagreeable to me to enter into this discussion, as it is foreign to the object of our deliberations here, and may, in the opinion of some, lead to sully the reputation of our public councils-As far as my memory will enable me, I will develop the subject. We will not differ with one another with respect to facts; perhaps we may differ with respect to principles. I will take the liberty to observe, that I was led before to make some observations, which had no relation to the subject under consideration, as relative to the Western Country, to obviate suggestions of Gentlemen, which seemed to me to be groundless. I stated that there was a period when the Southern States were advocates for the alienation or suspension of the right to the Mississippi, (I will not say which) and the Eastern States were against both. I mentioned this to shew, that there was no disposition in that part, to surrender that right or dispose of that country. I do suppose that the fishery had its influence on those States-No doubt it was the case. For that, and other reasons, they still continue against the alienation. For it might lessen the security of retaining the fishery. From the best information, it never was the sense of the people at large, or the prevailing characters of the Eastern States, to approve of the measure. If interest, Sir, should continue to operate on them, I humbly conceive, that they will derive more advantage from holding the Mississippi, than even the Southern States: For, if the carrying business be their natural province, how can it be so much extended and advanced, as by giving encouragement to agriculture - in the Western Country, and having the emolument of carrying their produce to market? The carrying trade must depend on agriculture for its support in a great measure. In what place is agriculture so capable of improvement and great extension, as in the Western Country? But whatever considerations may prevail in that quarter, or any other, respecting their interest, I think we may fairly suppose that the consideration which the honorable member mentioned, and which has been repeated, I mean the emigrations which are going on to the Westward, must produce the same effect as to them, which it may produce with respect to us-Emigrations are now going on from that quarter as well as from this State.
I readily confess that neither the old Confederation, nor the new Constitution, involves a right to give up the navigation of the Mississippi - It is repugnant to the law of nations. I have always thought and said so. Although the right be denied, there may be emergencies which will make it necessary to make a sacrifice. But there is a material difference between emergencies of safety in time of war, and those which may relate to mere commercial regulations You might on solid grounds deny in time of peace, what you give up in time of war. I do not conceive, however, that there is that extreme aversion in the minds of the people of the Eastern States, to emigrate to the Westward, which was insinuated by my honorable friend. Particular citizens, it cannot be doubted, may be averse to it. But it is the sense of the people at large, which will direct the public measures. We find from late arrangements made between Massachusetts and New-York, that a very considerable country to the Westward of New-York, was disposed of to Massachusetts, and by Massachusetts to some individuals, to conduct emigrants to that country.
There were seven States who thought it right to give up the navigation of the Mississippi for 25 years, for several reasons which have been mentioned. As far as I can recollect, it was nearly as my honorable friend [James Monroe] said. But they had no idea of absolutely alienating it. I think one material consideration which governed them was, that there were grounds of serious negotiation between Great-Britain and Spain, which might bring on a coalition between those nations, which might enable them to bind us on different sides, permanently withhold that navigation from us, and injure us in other respects materially. The temporary cession, it was supposed would fix the permanent right in our favor, and prevent that dangerous coalition. It is but justice to myself to say, that however plausible the reasons urged for its temporary cession may have been, they never convinced me of its utility. I have uniformly disapproved of it, and do now. With respect to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, I am intimately connected with him. I shall say nothing of his abilities and attachment to his country. His character is established in both respects. He has given a train of reasoning which governed him in his project. If he was mistaken, his integrity and probity more than compensate for the error.
I am led to think there is no settled disposition in seven States to give up that object, because New-Jersey on a further consideration of the subject, actually gave instructions to her Delegates to oppose it. And what was the ground of this? I do not know the extent and particular reasons of her instructions. But I recollect, that a material consideration was, that the cession of that river would diminish the value of the Western Country, which was a common fund for the United States, and would consequently tend to impoverish their public treasury. These, Sir, were rational grounds.
Give me leave, Sir, as I am upon this subject, and as the Honorable Gentleman [James Monroe] has raised a question, whether it be not more secure under the old than the new Constitution-to differ from him. I shall enter into the reasoning which, in my mind, renders it more secure under the new system-Two-thirds of the Senators present, (which will be nine States, if all attend to their duty) and the President, must concur in every treaty which can be made. Here are two distinct and independent branches, which must agree to every treaty. Under the existing system two thirds of the States must concur to form a treaty. But it is but one body. Gentlemen may reason and conclude differently on this subject. I own that as far as I have any rights, which are but trivial, I would rather trust them to the new than the old Government.
2 Besides, let me observe, that the House of Representatives will have a material influence on the Government, and will be an additional security in this respect: But there is one thing which he mentioned, which merits attention. If commercial policy be a source of great danger, it will have less influence in the new system, than in the old. For in the House of Representatives, it will have little or no influence. They are drawn from the landed interest; taken from the States at large, and many of them from the Western Country. Whereas the present members of Congress have been taken from the Atlantic side of the Continent. When we calculate the dangers that may arise in any case, we judge from the rules of proportion, and chances of numbers. The people at large choose those who elect the President. The weight of population will be to the Southward, if we include the Western Country. There will then be a majority of the people in favor of this right. As the President must be influenced by the sense and interest of his electors, as far as it depends on him (and his agency in making treaties is equal to that of the Senate) he will oppose the cession of that navigation. As far as the influence of the Representatives goes, it will also operate in favor of this right. The power of treaties is not lodged in the Senators of particular States. Every State has an equal weight. If ten Senators can make a treaty, ten Senators can prevent one from being made. It is from a supposition, that all the Southern Delegates will be absent, that ten Senators, or two-thirds of a majority, can give up this river. The possibility of absence operates equally as much against the Northern States. If one-fifth of the members present think the measure erroneous, the votes of the States are to be taken upon it, and entered on the journals. Every Gentleman here ought to recollect, that this is some security, as the people will thereby know those who advocate iniquitous measures. If we consider the number of changes in the members of the Government, we will find it another security. But after all, Sir, what will this policy signify, which tends to surrender the navigation of the Mississippi? Resolutions of Congress to retain it, may be repeated, and re-echoed from every part of the United States. It is not resolutions of this sort, which the people of this country wish for. They want an actual possession of the right, and protection in its enjoyment. Similar resolutions have been taken under the existing system, on many occasions. But they have been heretofore, and will be hereafter, in my opinion, nugatory and fruitless, unless a change takes place which will give energy to the acts of the Government.
I will take the liberty to touch once more on the several considerations which produced the question, because perhaps the Committee may not yet thoroughly comprehend it. In justice to those Gentlemen who concluded in favor of the temporary cession, I mention their reasons, although I think the measure wrong. The reasons for so doing under the old system, will be done away by the new system. We could not, without national dishonor, assert our right to the Mississippi, and suffer any other nation to deprive us of it. This consideration, with others before mentioned, influenced them. I admit it was wrong. But it is sufficient to prove that they acted on principles of integrity. Will they not be bound by honor and conscience, when we are able to enjoy and retain our right, not to give it up, or suffer it to be interrupted? A weak system produced this project. A strong system will remove the inducement. For may we not suppose it will be reversed by a change of system? I was called up to say what was its present situation. There are some circumstances within my knowledge which I am not at liberty to communicate to this House. I will not go farther than to answer the objections of Gentlemen. I wish to conceal no circumstance which I can relate consistently with my duty. As to matters of fact, I have advanced nothing which I presume will be contradicted. On matters of opinion, we may differ. Were I at liberty, I could develop some circumstances, which would convince this House, that this project will never be revived in Congress, and that therefore no danger is to be apprehended.
Mr. Grayson-Mr. Chairman.-The Honorable Gentleman last up concluded, by leaving impressions, that there were some circumstances, which, were he at liberty to communicate, would induce this House to believe that the matter would never be revived. Were we to conclude from facts and opinions, or were we to appeal to the resolutions of Congress, a very different conclusion would result. When I was in Congress last, there was a resolution to apologize to his Catholic Majesty for not making the treaty, and intimating that when the situation of things were altered, it might be done. Had it not been for one particular circumstance, it would have been concluded on the terms my honorable friend mentioned. When I was last in Congress, the project was not given over. Its friends thought it would be renewed. With respect to the Mississippi and back-lands, the Eastern States are willing to relinquish that great and essential right. For they consider the consequences of governing the Union, as of more importance than those considerations which he mentioned should induce them to favor it.
But says the Honorable Gentleman, there is a great difference between actually giving it up altogether, and a temporary cession If the right was given up for 25 years, would this country be able to avail herself of her right, and resume it at the expiration of that period? If ever the House of Bourbon should be at war with all Europe, then would be the golden opportunity regaining it. Without this, we never could wrest it from the House of Bourbon, the branches of which always support each other. If things continue as they are now, emigrations will continue to that country. The hope that this great national right will be retained, will induce them to go thither. But take away that hope, by giving up the Mississippi for 25 years, and the emigrations will cease. As interest actuates mankind, will they go thither when they know they cannot enjoy the privilege of navigating that river, or find a ready market for their produce? There is a majority of States which look forward with anxiety to the benefits of the commercial project with Spain. In the course of the Spanish negotiation, our Delegation thought of a project which would be accommodated to their particular interest. It was proposed by way of compromise, as being suitable to the interest of all the States-That the Spanish crown should make New-Orleans a general depositary, and that the growth of the American States should be sent down for the use of the Spanish troops; Spain being obliged to foreign nations for provisions. -This was throwing out a lure to the Eastern States, to carry the produce of that whole country-But this temptation did not succeed-It was thought no object in their view, when greater objects presented themselves.
It was alledged, that the emigrations from the Eastern States will have the same effect as emigrations from this country. I know every step will be taken to prevent emigrations from thence; as it will be their the Southern States. will transferring population to -They coincide in no measure that will tend to increase the weight or influence of the Southern States.-There is therefore a wide line of distinction between migrations from thence and from hence.
But we are told, in order to make that paper acceptable to the Kentucky people, that this high act of authority cannot, by the law of nations, be warrantable, and that this great right cannot be given up- I think so also-But how will the doctrine apply to America?-After it is actually given away, can it be reclaimed?-If nine States give it away, what will the Kentucky people do?-Will Grotius and Puffendorff relieve them?-If we reason from what was done if seven States attempted to do what nine States ought to have done, you may judge of the attention which will be paid to the law of nations.-Should Congress make a treaty to yield the Mississippi; that people will find no redress in the law of nations.
But says he [James Madison], Massachusetts is willing to protect emigrations-When the act of Congress passed, respecting the settlement of the Western Country, and establishing State there, it passed in a lucky moment I was told that that State was extremely uneasy about it, and that in order to retain her inhabitants, lands, in the province of Maine, were lowered to the price of one dollar per acre. As to the tract of country conveyed by New-York to Massachusetts, neither of them had a right to it.-Perhaps that great line of policy of keeping the population on that side of the Continent, in contradistinction to the emigrations to the Westward of us, actuated Massachusetts in that transaction. There is no communication between that country and the Mississippi. The two great northern communications are by the North River, and by the River St. Lawrence, to the Mississippi - But there is no communication between that country where the people of Massachusetts emigrate, and the Mississippi; nor do I believe there ever will be one traveller from it thither.
I have a great regard for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs-In my opinion, all America is under great obligations to him-But I differed in opinion with him.
3But the Mississippi is said to be more secure under the new, than the old Government-It is infinitely more secure under the latter than the former-How is the fact?-Seven States wished to pass an affirmative act ceding it.-They repealed part of the instructions given the Secretary, to enable him to conclude a compact for its cession, and wished to get nine States to agree to it.-Nine States by the Confederation, must concur in the formation of treaties.-This saved it-Only seven States were willing to yield it.-But by this Constitution, two-thirds of the Senators present, with the President, can make any treaty.-A quorum is fourteen-two-thirds of which are ten.-We find then, that ten members can at any time surrender that great and valuable right.-As seven States are willing to yield it now, how the Gentle-man [James Madison] can reason in the manner he does, I cannot conceive.
Mr. Henry-Mr. Chairman-I hope, Sir, that as the Honorable Gentleman on my left set the example of debating the merits, that whatever may result as consequences of that example, may not be attributed to me. I hope that I shall be indulged in offering a few words in addition to what has been said. Gentlemen may do what they will-Their reflections will have no influence on me-It is said that we are scuffling for Kentucky votes, and attending to local circumstances. But if you consider the interest of this country, you will find that the interest of Virginia and Kentucky are most intimately and vitally connected. When I see the great rights of the community in real danger, the ideal dangers which Gentlemen speak of, dissipate. An union with our Western brethren, is highly desirable almost on any terms; an union with them alone can lessen or annihilate the dangers arising from that species of population, of which we have been reminded in the catalogue of dangers which were dwelt upon. They are at present but few in number, but may be very numerous hereafter. If that fatal policy shall take place, you throw them into the arms of Spain. If Congress should, for a base purpose, give away this dearest right of the people, your Western brethren will be ruined. We ought to secure to them that navigation which is necessary to their very existence. If we do not, they will look upon us as betrayers of their interest. Shall we appear to care less for their interest than for that of distant people. When Gentlemen tell us that the change of system will render our Western brethren more secure, and that this system will not betray them, they ought to prove it. When a matter which respects the great national interests of America is concerned, we expect the most decided proofs. Have they given any? Unless you keep open the Mississippi, you never can increase in number. Although your population should go on to an infinite degree, you will be in the minority in Congress; and although you should have a right to be the majority, yet so unhappily is this system of politics constituted, that you will ever be a contemptible minority. To preserve the balance of American power, it is essentially necessary that the right to the Mississippi should be secured.
But said the Honorable Gentleman [James Madison], the Eastern States will wish to secure their fishery, and will therefore favour this right. How does he draw the inference? Is it possible that they can act on that principle? The principle which led the Southern States to admit of the cession, was to avoid the most dreadful perils of the war. But their difficulties are now ended by peace. Is there any thing like this that can influence the minds of the people of the North? Since the peace, those States have discovered a determined resolution to give away. There was no similar danger to compel them to yield it? No, Sir, they wished to relinquish it. Without any kind of necessity, they acted in conformity to their natural disposition, with respect to emigrations going on in that quarter. This, though improbable, may be so. But to say, that because some settlements are going on in New-York, Massachusetts, will form a connection with the Mississippi, is to my mind most wonderful indeed. The great balance will be in the Southern parts of America. There is the most extensive and fertile territory.-There is the happiest geographical position, situated contiguously to that valuable and inestimable river. But the settlement of that country will not be warranted by the New Constitution, if it will not be forbidden by it. No Constitution under Heaven, founded on the principles of justice, can warrant the relinquishment of the most sacred rights of the society, to promote the interest of one part of it. Do you not see the danger into which you are going to throw one of your dearest and most valuable rights? The people of that country now receive great and valuable emoluments from that right being protected by the existing Government. But they must now abandon them. For is there any actual security? Shew me any clause in that paper which secures that great right: What was the calculation which told you that they would be safer under the New than the Old Government? In my mind, it was erroneous.
The Honorable Gentleman [James Madison] told you that there were two bodies or branches which must concur to make a treaty. Sir, the President as distinguished from the Senate, is nothing. They will combine and be as one. My Honorable friend [William Grayson] said that ten men, the Senators of five States, could give it up. The present system requires the consent of nine States. Consequently their security will be much diminished.
4 The people of Kentucky, though weak now, will not let the President and Senate take away this right. Look right and see this abominable policy-consider seriously its fatal and pernicious tendency. Have we not that right guaranteed to us by the most respectable power in Europe? France has guaranteed to us our sovereignty and all its appendages What are its appendages? Are not the rivers and waters that wash the shores of the country appendages, inseparable from our right of sovereignty? France has guaranteed this right to us in the most full and extensive manner. What would have been the consequences had this project with Spain been completed and agreed to? France would have told you, "You have given it up yourselves-you have put it on a different footing, and if your bad policy has done this, it is your own folly.-You have drawn it on your own heads, and as you have bartered away this valuable right, neither policy nor justice will call on me to guarantee what you gave up yourselves. This language would satisfy the most sanguine American.
Is there any opinion, that any future projects will better secure you-If this strong Government contended for, be adopted, seven States will give it up forever-For a temporary cession, is, in my opinion, perfectly the same thing.-The thing is so obviously big with danger, that the blind man himself might see it.
As to the American Secretary [John Jay], the goodness of his private character is not doubted.-It is public conduct which we are to inspect. The public conduct of this Secretary goes against the express authority of nine States.-Although he may be endowed with the most brilliant talents, I have a right to consider his politics as abandoned. Yet his private virtues may merit applause.-You see many attempts made, which, when brought into actual experiment, are found to result from abandoned principles.-The States are geographically situated so and so.-Their circumstances are well known.-It is suggested this expedient was only to temporize till a more favorable opportunity. Will any Gentleman tell me, that the business was taken up hastily, when that vote was taken in Congress?-When you consider the ability of the Gentlemen who voted in Congress on that question, you must be persuaded that they knew what they were about. American interest was understood-New-jersey called her Delegates from Congress for having voted against this right.-Delegates may be called and instructed under the present system; but not by the new Constitution.- The measure of the Jersey Delegates was adverse to the interest of that State, and they were recalled for their conduct.
The Honorable Gentleman [James Madison] has said, that the House of Representatives would give some curb to this business of treaties, respecting the Mississippi.-This to me is incomprehensible.-He will excuse me, if I tell him, he is exercising his imagination and ingenuity.-Will the Honorable Gentleman say, that the House of Representatives will break through their balances and checks, and break into the business of treaties?-He is obliged to support this opinion of his, by supposing, that the checks and balances of this Constitution are to be an impenetrable wall for some purposes, and a mere cobweb for some other purposes. What kind of Constitution then can this be?- I Leave the Gentlemen to draw the inference. I may have misunderstood the Gentleman, but my notes tell me, that he said the House of Representatives might interfere and prevent the Mississippi from being given away. They have no power to do this by the Constitution. There will be a majority against it there also.
5 Can you find on the journals, the names of those who sacrifice your interest? Will they act so imprudently as to discover their own nefarious project? At present you may appeal to the voice of the people, and send men to Congress positively instructed to obey your direction. You can recall them if their system of policy be ruinous-But can you in this Government recal your Senators?-Or can you instruct them?-You cannot recal them.-You may instruct them, and offer your opinions;-but if they think them improper, they may disregard them.-If they give away or sacrifice your most valuable rights, can you impeach or punish them?- I
f you should see the Spanish Ambassador bribing one of your senators with gold, can you punish him?-Yes-You can impeach him before the Senate-A majority of the Senate may be sharers in the bribe.-Will they pronounce him guilty who is in the same predicament with themselves?-Where then is the security?-I ask not this out of triumph, but anxiously to know if there be any real security.
6 The Gentleman here observed, what I would not give a single pin for.-The doctrine of chances it seems, will operate in our favor.-This ideal figurative doctrine will satisfy no rational people. I have said enough to answer the Gentleman as to retaining the navigation.
Give me leave to tell you that when the great branch of the House of Bourbon has guaranteed to us this right, I wish not to lean on American strength, which may be employed to sacrifice it. This present despised system alone has reserved it. It rests on strong grounds on the arms of France. The Honorable Member [James Madison] then told us, that he thought the project would not be revived. Here again the doctrine of chances is introduced. I will admit that the Honorable Gentleman can calculate as to future events. But it is too much for him to say that it will not be taken up again. The same disposition may again revive that nefarious abandoned project. I can inform him of this, that the American Ambassador advises, to let it rest for the present, which insinuates that it will be resumed at a more favorable opportunity. If this be the language or spirit which causes its suspension, this nefarious abominable project will be again introduced the first favorable opportunity. We cannot fortify the Atlantic Ocean. The utmost we can do, is to become formidable to the Westward. This will be prevented, if this abominable project be adopted. Mr. Henry then added, that in treating the subject at large he followed the example of other Gentlemen, and that he trusted he should be permitted to consider it generally again.
Mr. Madison arose and observed, that the particular ground, on which the abandonment of that project was founded, was, that it was repugnant to the wishes of a great part of America. This reason says he, becomes stronger and stronger every day, and the sense of America will be more and more known, and more and more understood. The project therefore will, in all probability, never be revived. He added some other observations which could not be heard.
Mr. Nicholas-Mr. Chairman-The arguments used to day on this occasion astonish me exceedingly.-The most valuable right of a part of the community has been invaded. By whom?-By Congress, under the existing system,-the worthy Member's favorite confederation. Is this an argument to continue that confederation? Does it not prove that that confederation is not sufficient for the purposes for which it was instituted? It was doubtful what proportion had a right on that occasion, to repeal the prohibitory part of the Secretary's instructions. The confederation which makes it a doubt, whether they had a right to sacrifice this right,-whether seven States and not nine, had a right to make the temporary cession, is the system which merits censure. Yet by an ingenious and subtle deviation, this instance is brought against this Constitution. We have been alarmed about the loss of the Mississippi in and out of doors. What does it all amount to? It amounts to an attempt under the present Confederation to yield it up! Why have we been told of the great importance of this valuable right? Every man knows it. No man has a greater regard for it than I have. But what is the question which the Honorable Gentleman ought to ask himself? Is this right better secured under the present Confederation, than the New Government? This is the sole question. I beg leave to draw the attention of the Committee to this subject.
It is objected by my friend to my left [Patrick Henry], that two-thirds of the Senate present may advise the President to give up this right by treaty, by which five States may relinquish it. It is provided in the first article, That a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business; and then in the second article, That the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties. What part of the Senate? It adds, "Provided two thirds of the Senators concur." What is the inference? That there must be quorum, and two-thirds of the whole must agree-I shall be told perhaps, that this construction is not natural, nor the positive construction of the clause. If the right construction be, that two-thirds of a quorum, or ten Senators, may, with the President, make a treaty-to justify the conclusion, that the Mississippi may be given away by five States, two most improbable things must concur: First, that on the important occasion of treaties, ten Senators will neglect to attend; and in the next place, that the Senators whose States are most interested in being fully represented, will be those who will fail to attend. I mean those from the Southern States.
7 How natural this supposition is, I refer to the candour of the Committee. But we are told, that we have every thing to fear from the Northern States, because they will prevent an accession of States to the South. The policy of States will sometimes change. This is the case with those States, if indeed they were enemies to the right. And therefore, as I am informed, by very good authority, Congress has admitted Kentucky, as a State, into the Union. Then the law of nations will secure it to them, as the deprivation of territorial rights is obviously repugnant to that law.
But we are told, that we may not trust them because self-interest will govern them. To that interest I will appeal. You have been told, that there was a difference between the States—that they were naturally divided into carrying and non-carrying States. Is it not reasonable to presume, that the advancement of population and agriculture in the Western Country, will mostly operate in favor of those States, who from their situation are best calculated to carry the produce of America to foreign markets?—Besides, as members of the Union, they will be materially affected by the sale of the back-lands, which will be greatly diminished in case of the relinquishment of that right. The same reason which induced them to erect States there, will also actuate them on every future occasion. But Congress has violated the Confederation. Shall we continue then under a Government which warrants, or cannot prevent, violations? Shall we hesitate to embrace a Government which will check them? But says the Honorable Gentleman over the way (Mr. Grayson) the Eastern States were interested during the war in retaining the Mississippi.-But now they have nothing to fear. Will war not return? A great part of his argument turns upon that supposition We will always have peace and need make no provision against wars. Is not this deceiving ourselves? Is it not fallacious? Did there ever exist a nation which at some period or other was not exposed to war? As there is no security against future wars, the New-England States will be as much interested in the possession of the Mississippi hereafter, as they were during the war. But says he, the Confederation affords greater security to the Western Country, than the New Government. Consider it maturely, and you will find the contrary to be a fact. The security arising from the Confederation is said to be this, that nine States must concur in the formation of a treaty. If then hereafter 30 States should come into the Union, yet nine States will still be able to make a treaty. Where then is your boasted security, if nine States can make a treaty, although ever so many States should come into the Union? On the other hand, how is this guarded under the New Constitution?—No certain limitted number of States is required to form a treaty. As the number of States will be increasing into the Union, the security will be increased. Every new State will bring an accession of security, because two-thirds of the Senators must concur. Let the number of States increase ever so much, two-thirds of the Senators must concur. According to the present system, nine States may make a treaty. It will therefore take five States to prevent a treaty from being made. If five States oppose a treaty, it cannot be made. Let us see how it is in the New Constitution.—Two-thirds of the Senators must agree. Kentucky, added to the other States, will make fourteen States. Twenty-eight Senators will be the representation of the States, two-thirds of which will be nineteen; and if nine members concur in opposition, the Senate can do no act. Five States you are told, have concurred in opposing the relinquishment of that right. Kentucky has come into the Union. She will oppose it naturally. It may be naturally concluded then, that that there will be at least twelve members in the Senate against it. So that there will be several persons in the Senate more than will be sufficient to prevent the alienation or suspension of that river. From this true representation it will at least be as secure under the new, as under the old Government.
But says he [Patrick Henry], the concurrence of the President to the formation of treaties will be no security. Why so? Will he not injure himself, if he injures the States, by concurring in an injudicious treaty? How is he elected? Where will the majority of the people be? He told you that the great weight of population will be in the Southern part of the United States. Their numbers will weigh in choosing the President; as he is elected by electors chosen by the people in proportion to their numbers. If the Southern States be interested in having the Mississippi, and have weight in choosing the President, will he not be a great check in favor of this right? Another thing is treated with great contempt. The House of Representatives it seems, can have no influence in making treaties. What is the House of Representatives? Where, says he, are your checks and balances-your rope dancers, &c? How is this business done in his favorite Government? The King of Great-Britain can make what treaties he pleases. But, Sir, do not the House of Commons influence them? Will he make a treaty manifestly repugnant to their interests?—Will they not tell him, he is mistaken in that respect as in many others? Will they not bring the Minister, who advises a bad treaty, to punishment? This gives them such influence that they can dictate in what manner they shall be made.
8 But the worthy member says, that this strong Government is such a one, as Kentucky ought to dread.-Is this just, Mr. Chairman? Is it just by general assertions, without arguments or proofs, to cast aspersions on it?-What is the situation of that country? If she has a right, and is in possession of the river, I ask the Gentlemen why she does not enjoy the fruits of her right? I wish, if she has the river, she would give the people passports to navigate it. What do they want? They want a Government which will force from Spain the navigation of that river.—I trust, Sir, that let the situation, Government and politics, of America be what they may, I shall live to see the time when the inhabitants of that country will wrest from that nation, that right which she is so justly entitled to. If we have that Government which we ought to have, they will have ability to enforce their right. But he treats with ridicule the situation of the territory settled by Massachusetts They can have no connection with the Mississippi. Sir, they are materially affected by the navigation of that river. The facility of disposing of their produce, and intercourse with other people, are essential interests.
But, Sir, we have the guarranty of France under the existing system. What avails this guarranty? If dependence be put upon it, why did they not put us in possession, and enable us to derive benefits from it? Our possession of it is such, that we dare not use it. But the opinions and characters of private men ought to have nothing to do in our discussion. I wish the Gentleman had always thought so. If he had, these debates would not have been thus lengthened. But we are not to calculate any thing on New-Jersey. You are told she gave instruction to her Delegates to vote against the cession of that right. Will not the same principles continue to operate upon the minds of the people of that State?
We cannot recal our Senators. We can give them instructions, and if they manifestly neglect our interest, we have sufficient security against them. The dread of being recalled would impair their independence and firmness.
I think that Kentucky has nothing to expect from anyone State alone in America. She can expect support and succour alone from a strong efficient Government, which can command the resources of the Union when necessary. She can receive no support from the old Confederation. Consider the present state of that country. Declared independent of Virginia, to whom is she to lookup for succour? No sister State can help her. She may call on the present General Government, but whatever may be the wish of Congress, they can give them no relief. That country contains all my wishes and prospects. There is my property, and there I intend to reside. I should be averse to the establishment of any system which would be injurious to it. I flatter myself that this Government will secure their happiness and liberty. Governor Randolph.—Since I have seen so many attempts made, and so many wrong inducements offered, to influence the delegation from Kentucky, I must, from a regard to justice and truth, give my opinion on the subject. If I have no interest in that country, I hope they will consider what I have to say, as proceeding from an impartial mind. That the people of Kentucky have an unequivocal right to the navigation of the Mississippi, by the law of nature and nations, is clear and undoubted; though, to my own knowledge, a question has arisen, whether the former connection of America with Great-Britain, has not taken it away from them. There was a dispute respecting the right of Great-Britain to that river, and the United States can only have the same right which the original possessor had, from whom it was transferred. I am willing to declare that the right is complete; but where is the danger of loosing it by the operation of the New Government? The Honorable Gentleman [Patrick Henry] tells us, that France has guarranteed to us the possession of that river. We need not trouble ourselves about it.—France, he supposes, will do every thing for us! Does this pretended security enable us to make use of it? Is there any reasonable motive to induce the Government to give it up? If it be not given up, if the guarrantee of France be any security now, it will be so then. I wish an Honorable Gentleman over the way had known certain facts. If he had, they must have operated on his mind to refrain from making such observations.—(Here his Excellency read the treaty of peace with Great-Britain, defining the boundaries of the United States.)—He then declared, that from the most liberal interpretation, it would never give the inhabitants a right to pass through the middle of New-Orleans. I appeal to what the French Ambassador said, in 1781, in Congress, that America had no right to the Mississippi. If the opinion of the Ambassador of his Most Christian Majesty, and the treaty, have any influence, why are we told such things? There is not a greater or less degree of power, given by this Constitution, than is necessary to be given; but whether the power of treaties be improper to be given or not to the General Government, I only now ask, whether there be any real danger of loosing this right? How many Senators are there? Twenty-six, supposing the United States remain as they are. We are told, that there were never more than seven States willing to give it up. So that there were six States against it. There can be little danger then of the loss of that navigation. Pennsylvania is interested to maintain the Mississippi. Her interest will stimulate her to do it. She has settlements near Fort Pitt, on the Ohio, which must be affected greatly by that cession. If his own arguments be credited, New-Jersey is against it. There is no danger of her voting the alienation of that right, as she instructed her Delegates to oppose it. The Southern States are naturally opposed to it. There will therefore be a majority in favor of the Mississippi; a majority that does not depend on the doctrine of chances. There will be 14 Senators against 12, admitting the States to remain as they are. It will moreover be contrary to the law of nations, to relinquish territorial rights. To make a treaty to alienate any part of the United States, will amount to a declaration of war against the inhabitants of the alienated part, and general absolution from allegiance. They will never abandon this great right. Are not the States interested in the back-lands, as has been repeatedly observed? Will not the connection between the emigrants and those they leave behind them, serve to strengthen opposition to it? The Gentleman [Patrick Henry] wishes us to shew him a clause which shall preclude Congress from giving away this right. It is first incumbent upon him to shew where the right is given up. There is a prohibition naturally resulting from the nature of things, it being contradictory and repugnant to reason, and the law of nature and nations, to yield the most valuable right of a community, for the exclusive benefit of one particular part of it. But there is an expression which clearly precludes the General Government from ceding the navigation of this river. In the 2d clause of the 3d section, of the 4th article, Congress is empowered "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." But it goes on and provides, that "Nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State." Is this a claim of the particular State of Virginia? If it be, there is no authority in this Constitution to prejudice it. If it be not, then we need not be told of it. This is a sufficient limitation and restraint. But it has been said, that there is no restriction with respect to making treaties. The various contingencies which may form the object of treaties, are in the nature of things, incapable of definition. The Government ought to have a power to provide for every contingency. The territorial rights of the States are sufficiently guarded by the provision just recited. If you say, that notwithstanding the most express restriction, they may sacrifice the rights of the States, then you establish another doctrine, that the creature can destroy the creator, which is the most absurd and ridiculous of all doctrines.
The Honorable Gentleman has warned us from taking rash measures that may endanger the rights of that country. Sir, if this navigation be given up, the country adjacent will also be given up to Spain; for the possession of the one must be inseperable from that of the other. Will not this be a sufficient check on the General Government? This you will admit to be true, unless you carry your suspicion to such an unlimitted length, as to imagine that they will, among their iniquitous acts, destroy and dismember the Union. As to the objection of my friend over the way, (Mr. Monroe) that so few States could by treaty yield that navigation, it has been sufficiently answered, and its futility fully detected by the Gentleman who spoke last [George Nicholas].
Another mistake, which my friend over the way [James Monroe] has committed, is, that the temporary forbearance of the use of the Mississippi might lead to the absolute cession of the Chesapeake. The Gentleman has a mind to make up his climax of imaginary objections, or he never would have suffered such an idea to obtrude on his mind. Were the Mississippi, as he says, in danger of being ceded, which I deny, yet it could not be a precedent for the relinquishment of the Chesapeake. It never can be put in such a jeopardy. All the atlantic States will oppose a measure of this sort, lest it should destroy their commerce.
The consanguinity between the Western people and the inhabitants of the other States, would alone have a powerful operation to prevent any measure injurious to them, from being adopted.
Let me, in a few words, endeavor to obviate the strong observations made to the Gentlemen from that country. I contend that there is no power given the General Government, to surrender that navigation. There is a positive prohibition in the words I have already mentioned, against it. I consider that the policy of the States, and disposition of the people, make it impossible; and I conclude, that their safety is at least as great under the new as under the old Government. Let me intreat those Gentlemen, whose votes will be scuffled for, to consider in what character they are here. For what have they come hither? To deliberate on a Constitution, which some have said will secure the liberty and happiness of America, and which others represent as not calculated for that purpose. They are to decide on a Constitution for the collective society of the United States. Will they, as honest men, not disdain all applications made to them from local interests? Have they not far more valuable rights to secure? The present General Government has much higher powers than that which has been so long contested. We allow them to make war, and requisitions without any limitation. That paper contains much higher powers. Let it not be said, that we have been actuated from local interests. I wish it may not be said, that partial considerations governed any Gentleman here, when we are investigating system for the general utility and happiness of America. I know such narrow views will not influence the Gentlemen from that country, because I know their characters. I hope this subject is sufficiently discussed, and that we shall proceed regularly.
Mr. Corbin-Mr. Chairman-All attempts made to biass the opinion of any Gentleman on this great occasion, are, in my opinion, very reprehensible. No member of this Committee can be a more zealous supporter of the right of navigating the Mississippi, and the other rights of the aggregate community, than I am. But that right, Sir, is in no danger. This has been proven with much ability by my friend to the left, and other Gentlemen.
We are told, that five States may make a treaty. I say, that five States can prevent a treaty from being made. Will not my argument be of equal force with theirs? How can five States make a treaty? This presupposes that the members from every other State will be absent when the important subject of treaties will be on the carpet. Is this plausible? Or does it not amount to an impossibility? He says that the House of Representatives can have no influence in the formation of treaties.—I say they can. Treaties are generally of a commercial nature, being a regulation of commercial intercourse between different nations. In all commercial treaties it will be necessary to obtain the consent of the Representatives-
9(Here a storm arose, which was so violent as to compel Mr. Corbin to desist, and the Committee to rise.)
The Committee then rose-And on motion, Resolved, That this Convention will, to-morrow, again resolve itself into a Committee of the whole Convention, to take into farther consideration, the proposed Constitution of Government.
And then the Convention adjourned until to-morrow morning, ten o'clock.