That local politicks could not (even as the senate is now proposed to be formed) but have considerable influence on the sentiments and conduct of one who considered himself as a State agent but that this would be greatly increased when the Senator held his place during the pleasure of the State only— That a man of a firm mind & extensive views might some times be induced to overlook the frowns of his State who might from partial views disapprove of a public measure—relying as before the expiration of his six years its ability would be sufficient notorious to justify him— But that upon the plan proposed this hope could not operate & if a man should now & then be found of sufficient elevation of mind to rise above the state of dependance in which this am[endmen]t proposed to place him he would instantly be sacraficed to the partial views of the State—
He observed that the great object of governmt required a permanent system & that wth. that view it was designed that the members shd. not only have some stability but that the senate shd. never be totally changed—That this design would be defeated if the amendment pas [i.e., passed] since the frequent change of the members by the State Legislatures would not only break in upon the established rotation but change the whole body in a shorter period that [i.e., than] was intended—
3That those only would remain who had their Eyes constantly fixed upon the mutations in their State Legislatures—& who would condescend to be the servile instruments of State parties— He observed further that as the place of senator became more important it would be the sourse of constant intrigues in the State Legislatures—That those who wished to retain that rank would injure the characters & misrepresent the conduct of those that were in possession of it And that they would generally be succesful in these attempts from the different
views lights in which every publick measure may be placed by artful men when those who are to judge of them are not possessed of all the circumstances on which they are founded—When the accuser is a member of the body that is to judge & when the absence of the accused leaves him ignorant of the charge— As to the second point he insisted that a rotation was an unnecessary abrigemt. of the right of the State Legislature—That their situation &characters rendered them the properest judges of the conduct of those that served them that to compel them to remove one in whose fidelity & abilities they had confidence was not only a reflection upon their judgments but might at times be attended with obvious inconveniences to the State—This subject he said had been fully investigated in the Convention which formed the state government as might be remembered by some gent. then on the floor—that after the most mature deliberation they had rejected it—But experience had since justified their conduct—and that the people in reelecting their first magistrate for a series of years had testified the value they put upon the priviledge of shewing their approbation of his conduct— He treated as chimerical the arguments which were urged to shew that the Senators could by their influence on the State legislatures render their places permanent—since this not only supposed corruption in the senate but that the influence of that corruption would extend to all the State Legislatures by whom they were eligible-He observed that all the powers of the Senate were checked by the other branches of the government, and that
the Gent. from Albany who had supposed them possessed of a power to declare war (Mr Lansing) had erroneously attributed to the Senate singly a right which was vested in Congress only—
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