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title:“Robert Yates' Notes of the New York Ratification Convention Debates”
authors:Robert Yates
date written:1788-6-27

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http://consource.org/document/robert-yates-notes-of-the-new-york-ratification-convention-debates-1788-6-27/20130122081254/
last updated:Jan. 22, 2013, 8:12 a.m. UTC
retrieved:July 20, 2018, 12:23 p.m. UTC

transcription
citation:
Yates, Robert. "Robert Yates' Notes of the New York Ratification Convention Debates." The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution. Vol. 22. Ed. John P. Kaminski. Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2008. 1935. Print.
manuscript
source:
Robert Yates, Notes, Library of Congress

Robert Yates' Notes of the New York Ratification Convention Debates (June 27, 1788)

SMITH. Explains the Principles on which the am[endmen]t is founded
* * * * *
R. R. LIVINGSTON. admts. the weight of some of Mr. Smith remarks.
To avoid a consolidation of the States. Admts. 2 Pro [positions] 1st. Prop: no imp[os]t on growth & man[ufactures] 2d. no Tax without a previous requisition— Principal source of Revenue Excise. Enumerates what may be the objts. of Excise The Govets. of the State hereafter exceedingly smal. The Natio[nal] G[overnment] extensive, incurs all the expence. 2d. Point vued in 3 diffg Lights Gent. suppose, the interest on the previous debts— They are mistaken, the demands will be Larger. what is the effect of Requisitions? now will complained with The states most remote from the Seat of war—have complyed the least. N. Y. complyed most, because of the Seat of war. S. C. also while the Enemy near—then issued certif[icat]e: and assumed the debt as a State. Suppose—requistns.—Legislature to meet at different Seasons, deliberate, and perhaps refuse—and the delay may produce ruin. A refusal of the state, is laying a foundation of an internal war. No Taxes in time of war—To borrow, on a fund, the amendt. will defeat this purpose.
1
These Reflectns. if they have weight, is particularly [appropriate to?] NY. as a comercial State. We suffered most during the war. Interference of clashing rights in the revenue a source [of] danger— But the N. Govt. will guard the State rights, as they are under the check of the States—The Senators for example—The Exe[cutive]: all checks upon corruption. why does not our Govt. usurp, our Rights, confidence in the men— The change of Representatives, every 2 years, a security agt. [an?] annihilation of the State Government. The offcrs. of the N. Govt. have no temptation to destroy it. We cannot suppose that the Union will lay taxes, on the Articles on which the State has laid taxes. Our State has double taxes—State & County taxes. no inconvenience we acknowledge that the State resources are competent to pay both State and national Governts. 3d. As it respects the People—very little consequence how they pay it—free from poundage, to the State Treasury. The Horse case chimerical—[- - -] seizure the herd. No Citizen would wish to give up the S[tate] G[overnment] and equally interested in the general Government. Would wish to confine ourselves to the subjec
* * * * *
2
HAMILTON. we are apt to contemplate, on money maters in favor of the danger, rather than its necessity. The division of Powers well adjusted may be well trusted. This is constructed on republican Principles—Short Period 2 Years It is the people's governmt. The Senate, how constituted—by whom—how long 6 years The Executive elected by the People. Admirable Token to chuse a good executive— how and by whom—The determn. of the Senate. you must then give Power.
What is meant by these general districts. Purse and the sword. how applyed to the general Govt. mere declamation. What is an adequate representn? no informn. given— it may be too great. 10.000000. 2000 Repres[entativ]es. This is a mob—no stability. 200. is sufficient agt. corruption or combination. The quest. of conven[ien]ce—What Portion of Power ought to be given to the G. G. what to be retained to the State. What the objects of the Genl. Gov. Commerce and common Defence.
3
Maintaince [i.e., maintenance] of civil Police—and common domestic admtn. in State Government. In England the one to the other as 15 to 1. N Govt. the great source of defence. Their defence and expence unlimited— without Limits— Limit the means or the resources—unwise We must run in Debt. N Govt. must command the resources of the Country. The power must be indefinite. and stand on the most substantial basis. An Extended republic, is more capable to secure the Liberties than a Confined one. Represent. may issue from any extent of Country—despotic Govt. Authors say can be extensive, but they say associated Rep[ublic]s may—It never can be the desire of the N Govt. to destroy the State Govt. it would be a suicide. Never can have a president, no senate Without a State Governt. — It is a dream, for it must end in a dissolution of the Genl. Govt. King feudal subjts. Barons—divided—dependence on the People— made the Change— people sided with the King agt. the Barons. that S G. will lose the confidence,—It cannot be—It will remain in reputation gradation of Love families— neighbours so on— Concurrent jurisdn. cannot be when one is supreme.

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