1JAY. Factions may prevail— as in Holland—this 1/3 may prevent a benefl. Loan— will promote wars— has been attended, with bad effects—in G. Britain— more important, to form this check, than under the confedn— In Rep. govts. sentiments under three divis [ion]s— suppose two contendg nat[ion]s— will be two parties—a third the public good—another local consid[eration]s—A Case put—suppose a contest—wt Spain Miss[issippi]— hastened— It may happen that the honour of the Country concerned—part may regret, that this war hast[e]ned— and will be loth to go into the war— wrong to do this— unwise to leave the safety of the whole to a part—Suppose the French & America concert oper[ation]s agt. the English—the English may influence a part— so the French— No restriction, as it respects the lower house of this kind— the same reasoning applies to Treaties as to borrowing—no great loss in not making a Treaty—The Eastern & middle States & Southern may clash— if a majority of the Senate— The States may be so divided— War is War— Atlantic States most likely to suffer— New States arising— Western States, may say we will not make War— The case of impeachments not similar—the lower house impeach by majority—two thirds of impeachments, under influence of parties—
2HAMILTON. The Gentn. states, the danger of making Loans in extreme—no Instances to prove— A nation, will seldom make them unless necessary— Rarely happens, that Nations in peace— ours [be?] a singular instance— To prevent Loans, is to give them the commd. of all their resources— The Gentn. think, it necessary to lay checks—he reasons diff—no Checks should be laid, in order to guard against foreign Enemies— one third will have it in their power, to retard operations— The Gentn. have laboured to prove Corrup—Foreign corruption most dangerous in Reps. This cannot be wise, cannot be proper —On all quest. some truth much error— The question, is to the facility of gaining the Resolution of the governments— The 2/3 of Senate to make a treaty, a matter of Compromise— though a restraint may be a proper restraint on Treaties, ought not to be on common defence— Gentlemen are for throughing so many embarrts. in the way, as to divest the govt. of the necessary force—
MORRIS. The want of confidence in the govt.,— this reason operates diffe[re]ntly when necessary to make a Loan—
HAMILTON sd If the States are not united, ther[e]fore necessary to clog it—concludes the other way— The major Interests, ought always to govern— If it shd. become a steady principle, not to make war for rights, soon have no rights—
3JAY. The danger of the amendt. calls him up— Suppose a dangerous war will it be wise to put it in the power of 5 Men to disarm the Continent—
MORRIS. The want of confidence in the govt.,— this reason operates diff[er]ently when necessary to make a Loan—
4HAMILTON. power of Restraint dangerous— we may have a War of defence—therefore dangerous. The reasoning, restri[c]ting, just or unjust— The object to carry on war for defence— ill founded, as applys— Contending, for corruption of a majority— they say a Corrupt. to a small part— Improbable the whole, shall be corrupted and corrupt the whole— Republic less likely to go to